Abstract. In this paper we propose a method to construct logarithmic signatures which are not amalgamated transversal and further do not even have a periodic block. The latter property was crucial for the successful attack on the system MST 3 by Blackburn, Cid and Mullan (2009). The idea for our construction is based on the theory in Szabó's book "Topics in Factorization of Abelian Groups".
Introduction
In the early 2000's Magliveras, Stinson and Tran van Trung introduced two public key cryptosystems, MST 1 and MST 2 , based on factorizations, covers and logarithmic signatures, of finite nonabelian groups [9] . Recently, Lempken, Magliveras, Tran van Trung and Wei [6] developed a third cryptosystem, MST 3 . Svaba and Tran van Trung published a newer, strengthened version of MST 3 [14] .
A main question is how to produce covers and logarithmic signatures for a group. Blackburn, Cid and Mullan [1] suggested a construction of so-called amalgamated transversal logarithmic signatures from exact transversal logarithmic signatures (for the definition see Section 4.1). Based on the use of these amalgamated transversal logarithmic signatures they presented a successful attack on the system MST 3 .
In this paper we propose a method to construct logarithmic signatures which are not amalgamated transversal and further do not even have the property of being periodic, which was crucial for breaking the system MST 3 (see cases 2 and 3 in [1, Section 4.3]). The idea for this construction is based on the theory in Szabó's book about group factorizations [15] .
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, covers and logarithmic signatures are introduced and some basic facts are presented. We briefly introduce the cryptosystem MST 3 , for further information see also [6] or [1] . Then we introduce the in [6] proposed platform groups, the Suzuki 2-groups. The question of how to construct logarithmic signatures is the main issue of Section 4. In Section 5 we present the method for the construction of aperiodic logarithmic signatures. We close with some final thoughts and remarks on further research in Section 6.
Covers and logarithmic signatures
The cryptosystem MST 3 is based on the use of covers and logarithmic signatures. We introduce them in this section and give a short overview of necessary results. Further information can be found in [2, [6] [7] [8] [9] . Throughout this paper, G denotes a finite group and every set is assumed to be finite.
Let K Â G and˛D OEA 1 ; : : : ; A s be a sequence of sequences A i D OEa i;1 ; : : : ; a i;r i with a i;j 2 G such that P s i D1 jA i j is bounded by a polynomial in dlog jKje. Then˛is a cover for K Â G if every product a 1;j 1 a s;j s lies in K and if every g 2 K can be written as g D a 1;j 1 a s;j s (2.1) with j i 2 ¹1; : : : ; jA i jº. We denote the set of all covers for K Â G by C.KjG/. If, moreover, the tuple .j 1 ; : : : ; j s / is unique for every k 2 K, then˛is called a logarithmic signature for K. The set of all logarithmic signatures for K is denoted by ƒ.KjG/.
We call the product a 1;j 1 a s;j s in (2.1) a factorization of g w.r.t.˛. Two factorizations a 1;j 1 a s;j s and a 1;h 1 a s;h s of g are different if
.j 1 ; : : : ; j s / ¤ .h 1 ; : : : ; h s /:
(Note that for˛D OEOEa; a; OEb; b the element ab has four different factorizations a b.)
If˛D OEA 1 ; : : : ; A s 2 C.KjG/ with r i WD jA i j for all i 2 ¹1; : : : ; sº, then the sequence A i is called a block of˛and the sequence .r 1 ; : : : ; r s / the type of˛. The length of˛is
Covers of minimal length are noteworthy due to the fact that less memory capacity has to be used. The interested reader is referred to [7] , [12] and [13] for information on this issue.
For the application in cryptography the following distinction is made. A logarithmic signatureˇ2 ƒ.KjG/ is tame if every g 2 K can be factorized in polynomial time (polynomial in dlog jKje) w.r.t. toˇ, otherwiseˇis called wild.
23
The map M, which we are going to define now, is used during the encryption and decryption procedure of the cryptosystem MST 3 . Later on we will identify factorizing w.r.t. a cover˛with inverting M.
Let˛D 
That is a generalization of n-ary representations. Let M W Z m ! K be the surjection
M.x/ WD a 1;j 1 C1 a s;j s C1 ; where .j 1 ; : : :
Note that 1 can be computed efficiently (using Euclid's algorithm) and, therefore, the same is true for M. Moreover, the map ˛d oes only depend on the type of , i.e. for˛;ˇ2 C.KjG/ we have ˛D ˇi f and only if˛andˇare of the same type:
Let g 2 G and let˛g denote the number of pairwise different factorizations a 1;j 1 a s;j s of g w.r.t.˛. Then g has exactly˛g different preimages w.r.t. M ı ˛, namely the tuples .j 1 ; : : : ; j s / with g D a 1;j 1 a s;j s . That is the connection to equation (2.1). Therefore, a logarithmic signatureˇ2 ƒ.KjG/ is tame if we can compute M 1 in polynomial time (polynomial in dlog jKje).
For F 2 ¹C; ƒ; : : : º we use the notation
3 The cryptosystem MST 3
Alice chooses a public non-abelian group G with large center Z and generates a tame logarithmic signatureˇD OEB The cryptographic hypothesis is the hardness of factorizing w.r.t. the random cover˛. Furthermore it has to be hard for the attacker to reconstruct the private key by using the public key. For information on these two issues we refer the reader to [1] , [3] and [10] .
Remark 3.1. Lempken et al. [6] demand two additional properties. Firstly the group G should not be a direct product of Z and a subgroup U Ä G, otherwise the system could be weakened using Schreier-trees [6] . The second assumption is a i;j a 1 i;l … Z for all i 2 ¹1; : : : ; sº and j ¤ l:
However, Blackburn, Cid and Mullan [1] did not use that property for their attacks, because it holds for a large number of public keys and it is not required during the encryption and decryption process.
Lempken et al. [6] suggested the use of Suzuki 2-groups (see also [4] and [5] ) as platform-groups for the system: Let Â ¤ id be an odd order field automorphism of F q (q D 2 n ). We then define the Suzuki 2-group as
where
Lemma 3.2. The center
is an elementary abelian 2-group.
Classes of logarithmic signatures
We will now concentrate on the construction ofˇand we will restrict us, motivated by Lemma 3.2, to elementary abelian 2-groups (denoted by 2 n ), although all results in Section 5 hold for every abelian group. Note thatˇis supposed to be secret.
Exact transversal logarithmic signatures
A logarithmic signatureˇD OEB 1 ; : : : ; B s for a group G is called l-exact transversal (r-exact transversal) if there is a subgroup chain
such that B i is a left (right) transversal of G i in G i 1 for all i 2 ¹1; : : : ; sº. A logarithmic signature is said to be exact transversal if it is l-exact transversal or r-exact transversal. We denote the set of all exact transversal logarithmic signatures for a group G by ET .G/. 
The logarithmic signatures that are constructed from an exact transversal logarithmic signature by applying a finite number of the four previous maps are called amalgamated transversal logarithmic signatures, see [1] . We will denote the set of amalgamated transversal logarithmic signatures for a group G by AT .G/.
The amalgamated transversal logarithmic signatures have the special property of being periodic, which Blackburn, Cid and Mullan [1] used to break MST 3 under the assumption that the platform-group G is a Suzuki 2-group.
A subset B of an abelian group G is called periodic if there exists a g 2 Gn¹1º (the period) such that gB D B. Let P .B/ WD ¹g 2 Gn¹1º W gB D Bº be the set of periods of B. Blackburn, Cid and Mullan showed that every amalgamated transversal logarithmic signature can be used as a private key in MST 3 . Their proof is based on Proposition 4.2, see [1] . Lemma 2.2] ). Let G be an elementary abelian 2-group. Every logarithmic signatureˇ2 AT .G/ is tame.
Since the usage of amalgamated transversal logarithmic signatures leaves the cryptosystem insecure, we are in need to find new ways of constructing tame logarithmic signatures, preferably some without periodic blocks. In this section we will introduce an algorithm to construct tame logarithmic signatures without periodic blocks for elementary abelian 2-groups G.
As in a logarithmic signatureˇevery group element is at most once in a block, we will consider sets instead of sequences in the first two paragraphs of this section to simplify the notation.
We call a logarithmic signatureˇ2 ƒ.G/ aperiodic if none of the blocks B i is periodic. The set of all aperiodic logarithmic signatures for a group G is denoted by A.G/. We are going to use the idea of the proof of this theorem to construct tame aperiodic logarithmic signatures for elementary abelian 2-groups, for example for the center of a Suzuki 2-group.
The algorithm
Now we are presenting the algorithm which constructs a new logarithmic signature out of a subgroup and a left transversal of that subgroup. The realization of some rather vague steps in the algorithm, namely the construction of ı and all˛. j 1 ;:::;j s / , will be discussed in the last part of the paper. 
.j / i j. We will denote a logarithmic signature, which can be obtained from U and R by the construction above, decomposed and reunited out of U and R, shortly d.r., and we denote the set of logarithmic signatures for a group G which are d.r. by DR G .U; R; E.U /; F .R// where E; F 2 ¹ƒ; ET ; AT ; : : : º. Notice that it is possible to construct an aperiodic logarithmic signature by using only total exact transversals, i.e. exact transversals where every block is a subgroup, see Example 5.2 above. Proposition 5.5. A logarithmic signatureˇwhich is d.r. is tame if ı and all logarithmic signatures˛. j 1 ;:::;j s / are tame and if jRj is bounded by a polynomial in dlog jGje (then for every g 2 G the coset representative in R which lies in the same coset as g can be found efficiently).
Remark 5.6. The last assumption of Proposition 5.5 is not required if G is given in form of a maximal set of generators ¹g 1 ; : : : ; g t º with the property that every element can be represented uniquely, where U D hg 1 ; : : : ; g i i, R D hg i C1 ; : : : ; g t i.
In that case we get the desired coset representative by using a projection.
Aperiodicity ofF
rom now on we assume thatˇD OEB 1 ; : : : ; B s is constructed by Algorithm 1 and we use the notation introduced there. Next we summarize some basic facts. After that we show how to choose the sets A Proof. We assume that there are i and j ¤ k with d These elements of R are in different cosets of U in G. On the other hand we have
which is not possible. 
The special case r i D 2 or 3 and pairwise different subgroups A
.j / i of the following proposition was proven in cooperation with Anja Nuss [11] .
Ä G for all j 2 ¹1; : : : ; r i º. If B i is periodic with period g 2 G, then
Proof. Assume that B i is periodic. Let g 2 G be a period of B i . By Lemma 5.9 we have for every j and D
.j / i
D ¹d i;j 1 ; : : : ; d i;j k º that
by multiplication with g, i.e. We construct aperiodic logarithmic signatures for elementary abelian 2-groups G. Such a logarithmic signature has already been constructed in Example 5.2 for G D 2 6 . Now we generate one for G D 2 7 and then use these two logarithmic signatures to construct tame aperiodic logarithmic signatures for all groups 2 n with n 6. The resulting logarithmic signatureˇis aperiodic of type .8; 4; 4/.
General construction. Let G D 2 n be an elementary abelian group of order n 2 N >7 and let B D .g 1 ; : : : ; g n / be a basis for G. Further, we choose an s 2 N and a partition v D .v 1 ; : : : ; v 2s / of n with the property 
Note that v contains the information which elements of B generate which subgroup U i resp. D i . Further, the order on G encodes the position of the elements of every subgroup of G (this information is needed for the factorization).
From now on we want every subgroup U i and D i of G to be ordered in the way mentioned above (except for U 1 and D 1 , because we do not need them to be ordered) and we write 
is not a multiple of A .l/ i for j ¤ l. Therefore, Corollary 5.15 implies that the resulting logarithmic signatureˇfor G is aperiodic.
Remark 5.17. For security and storage issues it seems to be reasonable to choose small subgroups U i and D i . Further, one should apply some of the operations from Section 4.2 toˇto hide the subgroup U 1 D 1 , more precisely, the blocks of the logarithmic signatureˇ0, otherwise an attacker could obtain a periodic (and therefore tame) logarithmic signature for G=.U 1 D 1 /.
In practice we want to store the following secret objects: B; v andˇ(remember thatˇis part of the private key in MST 3 ).
Question 3. Can we store the group G represented in B without revealingˇ? Then it would be possible to drop the currently necessary basis transformation.
We now give the algorithm for the factorization of a group element g w.r.t. the just constructed logarithmic signatureˇ.
Algorithm 2: Factorization
input : An arbitrary element g 2 G output:
Let y D .y 1 ; : : : ; y n / D B .g/ be the coordinate vector of g w.r.t B; Let .h 2 ; : : : ; h s / be the .s 1/-tuple consisting of only ones; Correctness. First we have to recall the structure of a block ofˇ: has to be eliminated from y, otherwise one could not determine the right element from B i 1 (except for the special case that k .t/ i has no U i 1 -part). We have to treatˇ0 differently, which is done in line 16.
Complexity. Inside the loops in lines 6 and 11 we have less than n operations (in Z), every loop has length less than n and the determination of the coordinate vector in line 14 can be done in polynomial time as well. Asˇ0 is tame, we have in total a polynomial runtime (polynomial in log 2 jGj D n), which means thatǐ s tame. Further, let K 2 WD ¹u; vwº and K 3 WD ¹v; uaº. This yields the subgroups The corresponding element is vw and this obviously has the factorization uv uw, meaning (ii) We could storeˇ0 and K i (i D 2; : : : ; s) instead ofˇ, but we would have to make some modifications in line 14 of Algorithm 2.
(iii) We might drop the strict total order on G, but then the factorization algorithm would be slower, although it would still have polynomial runtime (instead of the computation in lines 6 and 14 we would have to search the element of B i in the factorization of g inside B i ). This could be necessary if the proposed construction turns out to be insecure.
(iv) A generalization of the algorithm to abelian groups without an element of large (compared to jGj) prime power order is possible if all the steps are changed accordingly. One should choose a maximal generating set B with the property that every element in G can be represented uniquely (meaning, we take for example an element of order p and one of order q except for one of order pq (p ¤ q)).
(v) Other strict total orders on G can be used, but then one has to adjust the factorization algorithm.
Conclusion
We presented a new way to construct tame logarithmic signatures. The advantage of this method is the possibility to produce aperiodic logarithmic signatures which resist the attack proposed in [1] . As far as we know, one is in need to store ı and all˛. j 1 ;:::;j s / to factorize with respect toˇ. This is also an aspect of security, since these objects have to be reconstructed even if an attacker knowsˇ. Therefore, it is an important question ifˇis tame whether or not one knows ı and˛. j 1 ;:::;j s / . Further, we showed how to get a huge number of aperiodic tame logarithmic signatures by using Algorithm 1. Although, those might not be enough, the fact that we mainly used exact transversal logarithmic signatures for the construction of our examples implies the assumption that many more aperiodic logarithmic signatures might be gained when using for example amalgamated transversal logarithmic signatures.
Still, it is not clear if Algorithm 1 has any weaknesses in view of the reconstruction of ı and the˛. j 1 ;:::;j s / from a givenˇbecause of the known structure of the algorithm, although in the special case (Section 5.3) we conjecture that keeping the used generating set B a secret makes it hard to extract any information.
